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Tohono O’odham Nation v. City of Glendale, 804 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 
2015) 
 
Kathryn S. Ore 
 
  Tohono O’odham Nation v. City of Glendale is a reminder of the 
tension between state governments and the federal government. It also 
reflects continued unease with tribal gaming policies. The Ninth Circuit 
reiterated the longstanding federal preemption doctrine to override the 
State of Arizona and City of Glendale’s attempted circumvention of the 
Gila River Bend Indian Reservation Land Replacement Act. In doing so, 
the court prevented state legislation from undermining the Tohono 
O’odham Nation’s ability to obtain replacement lands for its reservation. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
  The primary issue in Tohono O’odham Nation v. City of 
Glendale was whether the Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands 
Replacement Act (“Act”) preempted an Arizona law, House Bill 2534 
(“H.B. 2534”), which permitted a city or town to annex certain 
neighboring unincorporated lands.1 The Act allows the Tohono O’odham 
Nation (“Nation”) to purchase replacement reservation lands and request 
the federal government take them into trust.2 Replacement reservation 
lands must be located outside the corporate limits of any city or town.3 
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona held the Act 
preempted H.B. 2534 and granted summary judgment to the Nation.4 
Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the district court holding and ruled that H.B. 2534 was a “clear 
and manifest obstacle to the purpose of the Act.”5  
  
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
  The Nation primarily descends from American Indians who lived 
along Gila River in Arizona.6 President Chester A. Arthur issued an 
                                                     
1. Tohono O’odham Nation v. City of Glendale, 804 F.3d 1292, 1293 
(9th Cir. 2015). 
2.  Id. at 1294; see also Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands 
Replacement Act, Pub. L. No. 99-503, § 6, 100 Stat. 1798 (1986).  
3. Pub. L. No. 99-503, § 6.  
4.  Tohono O’odham Nation, 804 F.3d at 1296-97.  
5.  Id. at 1300-01. 
6. Id. at 1294. 
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executive order in 1882 setting aside the Gila Bend Indian Reservation 
(“Reservation”) in southwestern Arizona.7 In 1960, the federal 
government completed construction of the Painted Rock Dam (“Dam”) 
approximately ten miles downstream from the Gila Bend Reservation.8 
Over the next several decades, the Reservation lands were rendered 
“economically unviable” by repeated flooding caused by the Dam.9 To 
remedy the situation, the Nation petitioned Congress for new lands.10 
Congress recognized its trust responsibility to allocate suitable lands for 
the Nation, and passed the 1986 Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands 
Replacement Act.11 The Act authorized the Nation to assign its lands to 
the federal government in exchange for money, enabled the Nation to 
purchase lands that would be held in trust by the federal government at 
the request of the Nation, and released the United States from any legal 
claims.12 Lands eligible for trust, however, could not be located “within 
the corporate limits of any city or town.”13  
  In 2003, the Nation purchased a parcel of unincorporated land 
surrounded by lands incorporated by the City of Glendale.14 The Nation 
later requested a portion of the purchased lands “be taken into trust 
pursuant to the Act,” and publically unveiled its plan to build a gaming 
casino on that land (“Parcel 2”).15 The Secretary of the Interior 
(“Secretary”) reviewed the Nation’s request and determined Parcel 2 
“satisfied all the legal requirements of the Act.”16 This determination was 
based on the Secretary’s conclusion that under the “plain and 
jurisdictional meaning of ‘corporate limits,’” Parcel 2 was not located 
“within the corporate limits of any city or town.”17 
  The State of Arizona and the City of Glendale (collectively 
“Defendants”) joined others to file lawsuits against the Department of the 
Interior in response to the Nation’s trust application and plan to build a 
gaming casino, alleging violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, 
                                                     
7. Id. 
8. Id.; see also Gila River Indian Community v. United States, 729 
F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2013).    
9. Tohono O’odham Nation, 804 F.3d at 1294. 
10. Id. 
11. Id.; see also Pub. L. No. 99-503.  
12. Tohono O’odham Nation, 804 F.3d at 1294; see Pub. L. No. 99-503, 
§ 6. 
13. Id. 
14. Tohono O’odham Nation, 804 F.3d at 1294. 
15. Id. at 1294-95. 
16. Id. at 1295. 
17. Id. 
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the United States Constitution, and the Arizona Constitution.18 The 
Nation intervened, and the suits were consolidated, styled as Gila River 
Indian Community v. United States.19 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
determined the phrase “within corporate limits” was ambiguous and 
requested the Secretary “consider the phrase in light of the [identified] 
ambiguity.”20 The Secretary reaffirmed its early interpretation, and on 
July 7, 2014, the federal government took Parcel 2 into trust.21  
  While the district court proceedings for Gila River Indian 
Community were pending, Arizona enacted H.B. 2534.22 H.B. 2534 
provided that a town or city could annex property surrounded, or 
partially surrounded, by incorporated lands, if the property owner 
“submitted a request to the federal government to . . . hold the [property] 
in trust.”23 The Nation responded by filing a lawsuit against Defendants, 
alleging the Act preempted H.B. 2534, and H.B. 2534 violated the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the United States and Arizona 
Constitutions.24 Additionally, the Nation asserted H.B. 2534 violated 
Arizona’s constitutional prohibition on special legislation.25  
  The district court entered a judgment confirming the Act 
preempted H.B. 2534 because it directly conflicted with Congress’s 
intent to enable the Nation’s lands to be put in trust.26 The court denied 
the Nation’s due process claim, holding the Nation failed to show H.B. 
2534 was “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and unconnected to a 
legitimate state interest.”27 It further denied the Nation’s equal protection 
claim, finding H.B. 2534 withstood rational-basis review.28 Additionally, 
the court held the Nation had not demonstrated “beyond a reasonable 
doubt that H.B. 2534 constitute[d] special legislation.”29 The parties filed 
cross appeals that were consolidated into a single suit.30 
 
 
                                                     
18. Id.; see also Gila River Indian Community, 729 F.3d at 1144. 
19. Tohono O’odham Nation, 804 F.3d at 1295. 
20. Id. (citing Gila River Indian Community, 729 F.3d at 1147). 
21. Id. at 1296. 
22. Id. 
23. Id.; see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-471.04 (2011) (preempted by Tohono 
O’odham Nation, 804 F.3d 1292). 
24. Tohono O’odham Nation, 804 F.3d at 1296. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
 
  The Ninth Circuit’s analysis focused solely on the Nation’s 
claim that the Act preempted H.B. 2534.31 The court noted that Congress 
derives its power to preempt state law from the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution.32 Preemption is divided into express, field, 
and conflict preemption.33 Here, the Nation asserted “obstacle 
preemption,” a type of conflict preemption.34 Obstacle preemption occurs 
where “a challenged state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.’”35 Courts focus on “two bedrock principles” when conducting 
preemption analysis: first, the evaluation of congressional purpose; and 
second, the assumption that states’ police powers should not be 
superseded unless that was the “clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.”36 These principles amount to a presumption against 
preemption.37  
  Despite the presumption, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s finding that the Act preempted H.B. 2534.38 In doing so, the 
Ninth Circuit examined “the ‘purpose and intended effects’ of the Act,” 
as well as the effect of H.B. 2534.39 Congress passed the Act to 
compensate the Nation for destroying its initially reserved lands by 
facilitating “replacement of reservation lands with lands suitable for 
sustained economic use.”40 The Act accomplished Congress’s intent by 
enabling the Nation to purchase land and incorporate it into tribal land by 
requesting the federal government hold it in trust.41  
  Under the Act, the federal government is required to take eligible 
land into trust if it meets several conditions.42 First, the Nation must 
                                                     
31. Id. at 1297-1301. 
32. Id. at 1297 (internal citations omitted); see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 
2. 
33. Tohono O’odham Nation, 804 F.3d at 1297 (citing Kurns v. R.R. 
Friction Products Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261, 1265-66 (2012)).  
34. Id. 
35. Id. (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 
373 (2000) (internal citation omitted)). 
36. Id. at 1297-98 (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)).  
37. Id. at 1298. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. (quoting Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373.) 
40. Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 99-503, § 2(3).  
41. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 99-503, § 6(c)-(d)).  
42. Id. at 1299 (citing Pub. L. No. 99-503, § 6(d)).  
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request the Secretary take the purchased land into trust.43 The land must 
also meet three criteria before it can be taken into trust: first, it cannot be 
located outside of the designated counties; second, it cannot be located 
“within the corporate limits of any city or town”; and third, it must 
“constitute[] not more than three separate areas consisting of contiguous 
tracts, at least one of which areas shall be continuous to San Lucy 
Village.”44  
  Defendants did not dispute that the Nation’s trust request met the 
requirements of the Act.45 Rather, they challenged the district court’s 
ruling that the Act preempted H.B. 2534.46 Defendants specifically 
challenged the district court’s interpretation that the phrase “at the 
request of the Tribe” meant lands must be incorporated at the time of the 
request to be considered ineligible.47 The Ninth Circuit determined the 
precise time when the Secretary assessed incorporation did not affect its 
preemption analysis.48 Therefore, it was unnecessary to decide the 
issue.49  
  According to the Ninth Circuit’s preemption analysis, H.B. 2534 
“clearly st[ood] as an obstacle to the implementation of the Act.”50 In 
effect, at the exact moment the Nation requested the Secretary hold 
purchased replacement lands in trust under the Act, the City of Glendale 
was authorized to “effectively veto [the] application” by preemptively 
rendering the land ineligible through annexation.51 Such action would 
block the trust application and “directly bar[] the Nation’s effort to 
incorporate purchased lands into tribal land.”52  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
  Tohono O’odham Nation exemplifies a careful analysis under the 
federal preemption doctrine, and more specifically, the application of 
obstacle preemption. Arizona’s attempt to circumvent the Act by 
enacting H.B. 2534 highlights the discord that often emerges between 
state governments and the federal government with regard to American 
Indian policy. The Ninth Circuit’s holding, therefore, serves as a 
                                                     
43. Id.  
44. Id.  
45. Id.  
46. Id. at 1300. 
47. Id. 
48.  Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 1299. 
51. Id. at 1300. 
52. Id. 
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reminder of the unique relationship between the federal government and 
American Indian tribes. Additionally, by restricting its analysis to the 
federal preemption doctrine, the court avoided deciding whether H.B. 
2534 violated the United States and Arizona Constitutions, and instead 
left those issues for a potential future case.  
